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[1] With the Dalit movement in Maharastra having grown stagnant, and Uttar 
Pradesh’s Dalit-led Bahujan Samaj Party possibly reaching the limits of its potential development, 
the vital forefront of Dalit politics has now shifted to Tamil Nadu. So writes Gail Omvedt in her 
introduction to Thol. Thirumavalan’s Talisman.1 Whether the recent upsurge of intellectual and 
political energy among Tamil Dalits shall indeed prove a model for Dalits elsewhere in India—or 
whether, on the contrary, there are not still more promising movements already afoot in the Dalit 
hamlets and urban slums of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, or other places yet unknown—is 
impossible to say. What is a good bit more certain, however, is that for the ferment in Tamil Nadu 
to succeed it must be translatable. This ‘translation’ cannot be limited simply to the translation of 
words. On the contrary, its translation must involve not only the translation of one language into 
another, but also of words into deeds at the national level—into policies that protect Dalits from 
violent atrocities not merely under law but also in fact, into substantive and not merely formal 
democracy, or into genuine land reform, to name but a few demands of Tamil Dalits. But before a 
demand can be implemented, or the argument found persuasive, it must not only be spoken but 
also heard. It must be taken up, it must be transcribed, translated, repeated, and repeatedly 
tested in political and intellectual contests. The demand that is spoken but once, or in a single 
place, fades on the wind. Similarly, when a laborer is beaten to death, or a Dalit hamlet [cēṟi] 
burnt to the ground, it only becomes an ‘atrocity’ [vaṉkoṭumai] when it is recorded as such, and 
subjected thereby to universal standards of justice. Insofar as these events remain within an 
entirely local context, the murderous beating remains a ‘just punishment’ [tarma aṭi], and the 
burning of Dalit huts, a restoration of the village order [ūr āṭci]. 
[2] The essence of the Dalit struggle, on the other hand, consists precisely in 
challenging this localization. What happens to Dalits in one particular village is no longer allowed 
to stay within that village, but is made known to Dalits throughout the state and, equally 
importantly, is fashioned as a challenge to extra-local authorities to uphold justice. But as all four 
books under review attest, extra-local authorities (in this case the Government of Tamil Nadu and 
its ruling Dravidian parties) have not only failed to meet this challenge but, on the contrary, have 
joined actively with the dominant castes in violently suppressing Dalits. These volumes, only 
                                                     
1 Although Samya, the publisher of Thirumavalavan’s two translated volumes, has chosen to spell his name with 
a double ‘a’ following the letter ‘m’ [‘Thirumaavalavan’], in this review I follow the more common spelling, 
‘Thirumavalavan,’ the spelling he himself uses (Gowthama Sannah, Viṭutalai Cirutaikaḻ Kaṭci party spokesman; 
personal communication). 
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three of which are translations in the literal sense, respond to this state of affairs by reaching 
beyond the state of Tamil Nadu and by posing the problems of Tamil Dalits as a matter of 
fundamental human rights. The impulse to translate local struggles into universal claims, in other 
words, is an inherent feature of Dalit politics and not merely an additional step. The publications 
discussed below are not, therefore, merely a documentary record of events and writings—they 
are themselves the very life of the movement. 
[3] The themes of translation and the confrontation between local and universal 
political moralities introduce this review because one of the most frequent charges against the 
Tamil Dalit movement in recent years has been that it has increasingly retreated from 
Ambedkarian universalism into a parochial Tamil-centric linguistic cultural nationalism. In making 
these charges, critics refer in particular to the Viṭutalai Cirutaikaḻ Kaṭci (‘Liberation Panthers,’ 
henceforth VCK) under Thol. Thirumavalan’s leadership. Yet although Thirumavalan does indeed 
affirm ‘Tamil,’ a careful reading of his speeches and writings—along with the political and 
intellectual context Viswanathan’s and Ravikumar’s contributions provide—reveals a complex 
negotiation between local and universal languages, and a transformation of terms that does not at 
all support these accusations. To grasp the significance of Thirumavalavan’s and Ravikumar’s 
interventions in Tamil intellectual and political life, I begin this review with a book that is not a 
translation, but which delineates the singular predicament of Tamil Dalits at the close of the 
twentieth century. 
[4] Dalits in Dravidian Land is, as its subtitle tells us, a collection of fifty-two ‘reports 
on anti-dalit violence’ by investigative journalist S. Viswanathan, originally published in the 
fortnightly newsmagazine Frontline over the ten-year period from 1995 to 2004. The majority of 
the reports describe acts of physical violence, which in Tamil Nadu have all too often been 
perpetrated upon Dalits by the authorized agents of the state—primarily the police—in addition to 
the usual dominant (BC) caste groups.2 Indeed, given the caste composition of Tamil Nadu’s 
police force, and its active support of the castes that dominate among its ranks (i.e. BCs) against 
Dalits, the distinction between caste- and state sponsored-violence against Dalits is of uncertain 
theoretical relevance. 
                                                     
2 On police violence, see especially chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 24, 30 and 35 ‘Terror in Uniform,’ ‘The Caste of 
Khaki,’ ‘The Importance of Karanai,’ ‘Killing Spree,’ ‘Police Held Guilty,’ ‘Mayhem in Gundupatti,’ ‘A Contentious 
Report,’ ‘Blaming the Victims,’ and ‘Police in the Dock.’ Another aspect of police violence against Dalits, which is not 
well covered in this volume (but see chapter 1, ‘Taken to Task’), is jailhouse torture and custodial rape. By contrast, 
these more quotidian aspects of police violence are amply described and documented in the writings of 
Thirumavalavan and Ravikumar.  
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[5] This uncertainty is deepened when we expand our optic to include, not just acts 
of violence in the sense of bodily harm and attacks on property, but also the various forms of 
structural violence Viswanathan documents, including what we might call ‘epistemic violence’ 
(Spivak 1999). Structural violence includes the social practices outlawed under India’s 
constitutional set up, but which nevertheless persist in Tamil Nadu with full knowledge of the 
state, such as Dalits being coerced into various forms of ‘traditional’ unpaid labor, or denied 
access to ostensibly ‘public’ resources like water, roads, and temples;3 elected offices being 
‘auctioned’ by caste councils;4 Dalits being physically prevented from voting as they choose, 
being forbidden to run for elected office, or being prevented from actually assuming office when 
elected.5 While the continuation of the foregoing practices involves the state only negatively—viz., 
by its failure to stop them from occurring—in other instances the state has been more directly 
responsible for structural violence against Dalits, for instance by suppressing non-violent Dalit 
political expression;6 by refusing to implement reservations policies to the extent that a large 
portion of positions set aside for Dalits remain permanently vacant (while apparently never failing 
to fill the much larger number of positions reserved in the state of Tamil Nadu for the members of 
various politically powerful BC caste groups); by conniving in the subversion of land reform and 
indeed by practicing what Viswanathan terms ‘land reforms in reverse.’7 
[6] But for the purposes of this review perhaps the most important form of structural 
violence against Dalits is epistemic—pertaining, that is, to the production of knowledge (or its 
absence) on the condition of Dalits in Tamil Nadu. This includes, for example, the pervasive 
failure by police and other responsible bodies to collect vital information about reservations, 
attacks on Dalits, non-enforcement of Constitutional mandates concerning access to public 
spaces and other resources including temples. Thus, for example, while it is well-known that a 
huge backlog of positions reserved for SC/STs in government employment are simply never filled, 
it is impossible to determine the precise magnitude of the problem. For as Viswanathan explains, 
36 of 141 government departments have simply declined to provide the relevant data, including 
                                                     
3 See, for example, DDL chapters 4 and 44. 
4 DDL, chapter 33. 
5 DDL, chapters 22, 29 or 36. 
6 DDL, chapter 13. On state suppression of Dalit political activism, see also: Human Rights Watch (1999) and 
Gorringe (2005). 
7 DDL, chapter 24; also, UH pp. 211ff. On the lackadaisical attitude of the Dravidian parties to land reforms more 
generally, see Sathyamurthy (1977), Washbrook (1989); for a contemporary assessment, explaining the 
retrogressive character of Tamil Nadu’s land reform policies in comparison to neighboring states like Kerala and 
Karnataka, see Thangaraj (2003). 
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the Department of Education and other educational institutions, which together account for nearly 
50% of all government jobs (DDL: 154). 
[7] Nor is it possible to gain any clear picture of the extent of violence against Dalits 
in the state’s predominantly rural society. For despite India’s SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 
1989, which is designed to provide Dalits special protection against hate crimes, police have 
proven highly reluctant to register cases against perpetrators.8 Thus even assuming Dalit victims 
gather the courage to report abuses by locally powerful caste groups, their complaints are 
frequently suppressed; official records thus grossly underestimate the problem.9 The non-
registration of cases under the Atrocities Act, however, merely continues a long-standing police 
practice of delaying and even outright refusing to file ‘first information reports’ (FIRs) in cases of 
attacks on Dalits, while vigorously pursuing false cases foisted upon them by village 
oppressors.10 
[8] Moreover, official government commissions have routinely been used to issue 
false or misleading reports even in cases where attacks are recorded. When the scale of caste 
violence is such as to force itself upon public attention, it has become commonplace in Tamil 
Nadu for the state government to appoint a special judicial commission to investigate. By 
appointing such commissions, the ruling party is able to circumvent the State Human Rights 
Commission, which is thereby prevented from conducting its own investigation (Human Rights 
Watch 1999: 124–126). The reports of these special commissions can generally be relied upon to 
show the state and its ruling party in a good light, and reports that do not are rarely made public 
(Human Rights Watch 1999: ibid). One glaring example discussed by Viswanathan is the so-
called Mohan Commission, appointed in the wake of an event in which police were alleged to 
have driven protesting tea plantation workers into the Tamirapalani river (Tirunelveli) with lathis, 
causing the drowning death of seventeen persons. In preparing his report, Justice S. Mohan 
simply excluded video taped evidence of police officers actually beating drowning men and 
preventing them from reaching the shore, and then contradicted what the excluded evidence 
clearly showed, announcing that ‘The death of the people who fell into the river is only an 
accident; the police did not beat them while they were swimming’ (TAL: 78). When activists 
                                                     
8 On this point, see Human Rights Watch (1999), and Uproot Hindutva, pp. 132–3. 
9 See Venomous Touch chapters 21, 29, 31, 36: ‘On the Borderlines: Dalit Rights versus Human Rights,’ ‘Caste 
Clashes and Aftershocks,’ ‘Rule of Law,’ ‘Research and the Armed Forces.’  
10 See Human Rights Watch (1999), and Venomous Touch, chapters 21, 28, 31: ‘On the Borderlines: Dalit Rights 
versus Human Rights,’ ‘Dalits and Parliamentary Democracy: A Report on the Chidambaram Poll Violence,’ and 
‘Rule of Law.’ 
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attempted to publicly screen a documentary film in Chennai containing footage that disproved the 
official version of events, the DMK government swiftly suppressed the screening.11 
[9] Thus one of the key questions that is posed, both explicitly or implicitly, in all four 
volumes under review concerns the nature of the state itself and its relation to society. As a 
secular, constitutional democracy, the state is formally distinct from the society it governs and the 
various particular identities of its citizens; police and administrative bureaucracies are putatively 
governed by a form of rationality that renders the ‘private’ social characteristics of its offices 
holders—their caste status for instance—irrelevant. Weberian assumptions such as these, and 
currently popular political theoretic models that continue to take the ‘rational’ character of 
bureaucracy as their starting point require rethinking if the arguments and examples put forth in 
these volumes are taken seriously. 
[10] What the authors argue is not that the state cannot be distinct from the society it 
governs—on the contrary, that the state might be distinct from and in some senses antagonistic 
to the existing social order is not just a theoretical claim for these authors, but a political goal to 
which they are all committed. Their claim, rather, is that in the particular case of India, the state 
has shown itself to be largely an extension of (caste) society rather than being distinct from it. 
And this is especially true of Tamil Nadu where, as Ravikumar writes in the forward to 
Viswanathan’s book: 
The police... have become mercenaries of caste Hindus. In Tamil Nadu, such a state 
of affairs became obvious after the DMK came to power in 1967... [W]hen antidalit 
violence was unleashed in Kilvenmani (1968),12 Villupuram (1978), Kodiyankulam 
(1995),13 Melavalavu (1997),14 Gundupatti (1998)15 and Thamiraparani (1999),16 the 
police abetted the crimes as perpetrators. Both the AIADMK and DMK have been 
united in the unleashing of violence on dalits. (DDL: xxvi) 
[11] Ravikumar’s focus on the post-1967 period is not accidental. For prior to 
Dravidian rule, according to Ravikumar, the Brahmin-dominated Congress party could at least be 
                                                     
11 On the drowning incident itself, see DDL chapters 19–21; on the Mohan report and cover-up, see DDL 
chapters 23 and 30. See also DDL chapter 25 on another government report exonerating the police force for a 
highly-organized attack by 600 of its members on the Dalit hamlet of Kodiyankulam; the Kodiyankulam attack itself is 
described in DDL chapter 2, ‘Terror in Uniform.’ The Mohan Commission report is also discussed VT ch. 15, ‘Judicial 
Terrorism,’ and in TAL chs. 8 and 12, ‘Police Terrorism’ and ‘Judgements.’ 
12 DDL, p. 29 n.5. 
13 DDL chapter 2. 
14 DDL chapter 11. 
15 DDL chapter 12. 
16 DDL chapter 19. 
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counted upon to protect Dalits from BC caste aggression (DDL: xxvi). Since coming to power, 
however, the distinction between state and BC aggression has been substantively collapsed. 
[12] Let us pause to absorb this claim. It is not that Ravikumar or any of the other 
authors under review are nostalgic for the days of Brahmin rule. On the contrary, a common 
complaint of Dalit leaders like Thirumavalavan and Ravikumar is that where they themselves 
have remained consistently opposed to Brahminical institutions, the heads of both Dravidian 
parties have long since come to embrace Brahminical Hinduism both in public and private (UH: 5, 
Rajendran 2001). And yet Thirumavalan and Ravikumar also recognize that opposition to 
Brahmins and to Brahminism does not automatically entail attacking caste privilege as such. Thus 
although Dravidian leaders were, at one time, undoubtedly sincere in their opposition to 
Brahmins, they failed to interrogate fundamentally the agrarian basis of caste domination, in 
which landed non-Brahmin castes were every bit as antagonistic to Dalits interests as their 
Brahmin rivals. And from the 1960s onward, the Dravidian parties unabashedly courted the 
powerful and populous BC castes, who were at once Dalits’ most immediate oppressors and the 
foundation of the Dravidian parties’ social and political dominance in rural Tamil Nadu.17 
[13] That ‘Dravidian land’ is no sanctuary for Dalits is well understood by those with 
close ties to Tamil Dalits, or who know the details of the state’s political history (Roberts 2007). 
But until recently at least, the prevailing assumption outside of Tamil Nadu has been that the 
allegedly anti-caste Dravidian movement (also known as the non-Brahmin movement) had 
entailed Dalit uplift in some fundamental sense. Thus Gail Omvedt, a respected authority on Dalit 
issues, expresses surprise at the lamentable condition of Dalits in Tamil Nadu: ‘Why has Tamil 
Nadu, once so apparently progressive in its... anti-caste movements, become today the scene of 
such great violence against Dalits?’ (TAL: xix, emphasis added). Omvedt’s question is a good 
one, but in phrasing it this way she appears to assume that there is something fundamentally new 
in the recent spate of anti-Dalit violence. It is therefore worth asking what exactly is different 
about the situation today, as compared to, say, the beginning of the twentieth century or earlier. 
Of the various forms of violence described in the four volumes under review, none are new—
routine beatings, murder, ritual humiliation and torture in response to individual acts of 
                                                     
17 The Dravidian parties never included Dalits in any significant numbers in decision-making positions. 
Nevertheless a palpable shift occurred in the 1960s, when party leaders began actively to court BCs at the expense 
of Dalits and to suppress any vestiges of agrarian or class radicalism that would threaten the parties’ non-Brahmin 
financial backers who were of landed and merchant caste background (Barnett 1976, Sathyamurthy 1977, 
Washbrook 1989, de Wit 1996: 64–96). 
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insubordination or infringements of ritual proscriptions; social and economic boycotts; and 
vigilante raids involving the destruction of Dalit homes and property, looting, and arson attacks on 
their hamlets in response to collective (as well as individual) insubordination. All of these are well-
attested in the historical record, and, far from being recent innovations, comprise the traditional 
arsenal of tactics for the perpetuation of caste society’s dominance over Dalits (Viswanath 2006). 
Nor is there any evidence of their being used more regularly, or more readily, in recent times; we 
simply do not possess the data that would allow us to make diachronic comparisons of this type. 
[14] What is new to the mid 1990s, rather, has been the particular form of 
insubordination to which these acts of violence are a predictable response: namely, it has only 
been in this period that Dalits have begun to assert themselves in the electoral sphere, by 
mounting credible independent challenges to the authorized candidates of the dominant parties,18 
and by independently contesting panchayat elections.19 Would a Dalit challenge to Dravidian 
electoral hegemony have been tolerated in earlier decades any more than it was in the 1990s? 
We cannot say. Therefore rather than describing the anti-Dalit violence of this decade as 
‘increasing intolerance of dalit assertiveness’ (DDL: 79), it would be more accurate to describe 
the 1990s simply as a decade of increasingly vigorous Dalit assertion. 
[15] Niceties of historical epistemology aside, Viswanathan’s reportage on the 
situation of Dalits in Dravidian land is essential reading for any student of caste politics. Although 
it comprises previously published work, the volume exceeds the sum of its parts. For what may 
be somewhat difficult for the casual reader to grasp is the extent to which the information 
contained in Viswanathan’s reports, although now a matter of public record, could nevertheless 
remain largely unknown. To understand how this could be, one must first understand how 
exceptional Viswanathan’s work is and the extent to which, apart from him, the significant 
features of anti-Dalit violence have been either underreported, reported in ways that distort by 
omitting critical content, or ignored entirely.20 Thus to cite just one example Viswanthan himself 
provides of the prevailing state of journalism in Tamil Nadu: ‘On 23 April 1994, a contingent of 
400 policemen supervised the bulldozing of sixty-three [Dalit] huts. All this merited [was] a few 
centimetres in one newspaper’ (DDL: 31). In highlighting what others have habitually ignored, 
                                                     
18 Previously Dalits who ran for office in independent constituencies were limited to those chosen to do so by 
Brahmin and non-Brahmin lead parties (DMK, AIADMK, Congress, etc.)  
19 Panchayats were only included with the rotating system of reserved constituencies in 1996. 
20 On the prevailing silence on Dalit issues in Indian journalism, see also: Ravikumar, ‘Unwritten Writing: Dalits 
and the Media’ (VT: 15–33), and N. Ram ‘Forward’ (DDL: vi–vii. 
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Viswanathan not only sheds light on the multiple dimensions of anti-Dalit violence in Tamil Nadu, 
but begins to reverse the epistemic violence that has rendered anti-Dalit crimes largely invisible to 
all but their most immediate victims. 
[16] Thol. Thirumavalavan is the leader of the VCK, Tamil Nadu’s most successful 
Dalit political party. Uproot Hindutva is a collection of 17 of his speeches, delivered between April 
1998 and November 2004; Talisman comprises 34 articles written by Thirumavalavan for the 
Tamil edition of India Today, a weekly newsmagazine, between August 2001 and February 2003. 
In translating his words into English, Meena Kandasamy has made them available for the first 
time—not just to non-Tamil speakers from the West, but more significantly to Dalits from 
elsewhere in India. For an oft-overlooked feature of Dalit politics in India is the extent to which 
Dalits from different linguistic regions remain largely cut off from one another, and for whom 
English remains the only viable lingua franca. For although relatively few Tamil Dalits read 
English, fewer still read or write in Hindi or other Indian vernaculars. The reverse is also true: 
although only a minority of Dalits from the Hindi-belt have access to English, their numbers far 
exceed those who can understand Tamil. 
[17] This returns us to the theme with which this review began, the meaning and 
significance of translation itself, and to the question of Thirumavalan and the VCK’s increasingly 
pro-Tamil rhetoric. This turn to Tamil has been criticized on two grounds: first, that it amounts to a 
politically retrograde abandonment of the broad, universalistic calls for justice made by 
Ambedkar, and second, that it is based upon an unrealistic expectation that non-Brahmins will set 
aside their prejudices and embrace Dalits within a common Tamil identity. Both criticisms bear 
upon the issue of translation. In the first, a Tamil-focused movement is assumed to be inward 
looking, centripetal, and inherently inimical to addressing all-India and global issues. Simply put, 
this criticism assumes an incompatibility between the turn to Tamil and translatability. The second 
criticism bears upon translation in the extended sense of a translation between words and deeds. 
For it accuses the movement of embracing a self-defeating strategy. And if the turn to Tamil is 
strategically self-defeating—if it weakens Dalits even within Tamil Nadu—of what relevance could 
the movement be to all-India politics or to the struggle of dominated subpopulations more 
generally? As I will explain, however, neither criticism rests on solid foundations. 
[18] I proceed in reverse order, by beginning with the second criticism (which deems 
the embrace of Tamil identity a strategic dead-end). The assumption here is that the value of 
invoking a common, caste-free Tamil identity turns on whether non-Brahmins heed Dalits’ call to 
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brotherhood. But this fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the VCK’s predicament and its 
most pressing political imperative: stripping Dalit voters away from the Dravidian parties.21 And in 
this the turn to Tamil has been an unqualified success. For until very recently, virtually all Dalits 
habitually gave their vote to either one or the other of the major Dravidian parties. It was not that 
Tamil Dalits maintained any kind of naïve faith that these parties in fact served their interests—on 
the contrary, Tamil Dalits know from personal experience the extent to which both Dravidian 
parties have continually sided with their oppressors—but that the DMK and AIADMK were, on 
one hand, the only game in town, and, on the other, espoused ideals (however much they might 
contradict them in practice) that ordinary Dalit voters strongly identified with. Not only that, but the 
Dravidian parties routinely dispensed ‘gifts’ to Dalit voters around election time.22 Under these 
circumstances, ordinary Tamil Dalits could be at once wholly cynical about the actualities of 
Dravidian politics, and yet remain steadfastly loyal to one or the other party in their actual voting 
behavior (Roberts 2007). 
[19] By claiming the mantle of ‘Tamil,’ the VCK appropriates for itself the Dravidian 
parties’ greatest ideological advantages—namely, the progressive idealism that has long been 
associated, in Dravidian rhetoric, with Tamil-ness itself. In the historical context of modern Tamil 
Nadu, ‘Tamil’ refers not merely to a particular linguistic identity, but equally to the universal 
progressive values—anti-caste, feminist, pro-poor, democratic, and humanist—that Dravidian 
leaders, following the lead of early Dalit leader Iyothee Thass, sought to characterize as inherent 
to Tamil Nadu’s authentic (pre-Aryan) culture. This appropriation of Tamil identity enables the 
VCK to claim the moral high ground vis-à-vis the Dravidian parties by calling upon them to live up 
to their own progressive rhetoric, while simultaneously depriving them of their most credible 
charge against the VCK (i.e. that it is a narrowly caste-based organization). The erosion of Dalit 
support, moreover, is of greater significance to Dravidian party dominance than simply the loss of 
their votes. For until recently Dalits were hired to carry banners and shout political slogans at 
Dravidian party rallies, and their attendance in large numbers at such functions were critical to 
Dravidian parties’ ability to produce a visual spectacle of mass subaltern support. But today Dalits 
frequently refuse to play this role, attending their own rallies instead (VT: 111–2). 
[20] Nevertheless, Dalits make up just under 20% of the population of Tamil Nadu, 
and in no constituencies do they comprise a majority of voters. Their political future therefore 
                                                     
21 I owe this analysis to Gajendran Ayyathurai, personal communication. 
22 Typically these would include such things as liquor for Dalit men, and cheap saris for women voters. 
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depends on their ability to form successful alliances with non-Dalits, and in the present day this 
means with either one or the other of the Dravidian parties. And the VCK’s negotiating power in 
the arena of parliamentary politics depends directly on their ability to consolidate the Dalit vote.23 
Their strategy, in other words, appears to be to strip Dalit voters from both Dravidian parties, only 
to then return those voters to them via carefully crafted electoral alliances. There is of course 
nothing paradoxical about this; instead of the Dalit vote being split more or less evenly between, 
and without any voice within, the two Dravidian political machines, the VCK is potentially in a 
position to force these parties to compete for votes they had long taken for granted. Nor is the 
prospect of alliance with Dravidianists necessarily a bad thing so far as politically progressive 
Dalits are concerned, despite these parties’ admittedly checkered record with respect to Dalit 
interests—so long as the Dravidian parties can be persuaded to uphold in practice the political 
values that they already theoretically endorse. By appropriating the Dravidian parties’ own 
professed progressive and anti-caste ideology (under the heading of ‘Tamil’) and, moreover, by 
positioning itself as its vanguard, the VCK under Thirumavalavan’s leadership may very well be 
able to have its cake and eat it too. For by challenging the Dravidian parties on these grounds, 
the VCK in one fell swoop stakes out an independent basis for Dalit power in the electoral arena, 
while nevertheless encouraging those parties to reform themselves and leaving open the door to 
cooperation. 
[21] Thus the first criticism of the VCK’s embrace of pro-Tamil ideology—viz. that it 
makes no sense politically—is questionable. There are perfectly good strategic reasons for the 
VCK to adopt this approach. Will it succeed? It is too early to say. But even as this review was 
being composed, news arrived that Thirumavalavan had been elected to India’s Parliament in 
alliance with the DMK. The critical question now is whether the VCK will prove capable of 
influencing the DMK’s policies towards Dalits, or whether, on the contrary, it will become so 
dependent on the DMK’s political and financial support that it will effectively forfeit its critical 
voice.24 Indeed, the rise of Dalit politics could very well prove a hidden blessing for Dravidian 
parties—for now, instead of purchasing the Dalit vote directly (i.e. by dispensing innumerable pre-
                                                     
23 That consolidation of the Dalit vote is the key political imperative for their party is explicitly recognized by VCK 
strategists (Collins 2009).  
24 Hugo Gorringe (2007) argues that this has already happened. 
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election ‘gifts,’ as mentioned above), they can woo ostensibly independent Dalit parties with 
lucrative coalition alliances, and then simply use these parties to canvass the Dalit vote.25 
[22] What then of the other, and perhaps more damning, criticism of the turn to 
Tamil—that it implies an ethno-linguistic chauvinism and an abandonment of Ambedkarite 
universalism, or that being pro-Tamil entails being opposed to (or at least cut-off from) India’s 
other linguistic identities, including from Dalits in neighboring states? The test of these claims 
resides in the actual uses to which ‘Tamil’ is put—in what the term in fact signifies in the context 
of VCK discourse.26 Until now commentators who habitually accuse the VCK and Thirumavalavan 
of ethno-linguistic chauvinism have not based their claims on any textual evidence, but have 
relied instead on the biased reporting of mainstream Tamil and English periodicals and on select 
out-of-context quotation. And because his words have not been available heretofore in English, it 
has not been possible for interested persons elsewhere in India to question the validity of these 
assessments. 
[23] Take the slogan ‘Aṉaittu moḻikaḷaiyum kaṟpōm, aṉṉai Tamiḻai kāppōm!’ (UH: 
121). The second part of this slogan translates as ‘we will protect Mother Tamil!’ and might very 
well seem to imply an inward-looking and defensive ethno-linguistic politics. Such an 
interpretation becomes more difficult, however, when we consider that equal weight is accorded 
to the preceding phrase: ‘we will study all languages!’ A party’s slogans are not coined 
haphazardly or by accident, and in conjoining the protection of ‘mother Tamil’ to a proclamation 
that party members will study all languages the VCK is making a deliberate statement. 
Personifying Tamil as ‘mother Tamil’ is nothing new in Tamil Nadu, moreover, and has been in 
fact a mainstay of Dravidianist politics since the 1930s. But where the prior Tamil protection 
movement revolved precisely around the refusal to learn north Indian languages, Hindi especially, 
the VCK reverses this by flatly denying any incompatibility between loyalty to one’s mother 
tongue and the embrace of all languages. 
[24] Among the most frequently-cited examples of Thirumavalavan’s alleged ethno-
linguistic nationalism is the fact that he and most other members of his party have legally 
changed their names from ‘foreign-influenced’ (i.e. Sanskritic) ones, like Ramasamy, to ‘pure 
                                                     
25 I would like to thank Michael Collins for alerting me to this possibility. 
26 Thirumavalavan himself denies any contradiction between his being pro-Tamil and his Ambedkarism (UH: 152, 
171). But the mere fact that he says it does not make it so, and for this reason I shall devote several paragraphs to 
examining what ‘Tamil’ in fact means in the texts under review. 
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Tamil’ names like Tolkappiyar. What, for Thirumavalavan and the VCK, is at stake? Examining 
his writings and speeches one does indeed find the rejected names referred to as ‘foreign.’ But in 
explaining his party’s opposition to these names, the fact that they are foreign appears merely 
incidental. The reason ‘foreign’ names are rejected is not because they are foreign, but because 
such names are seen as linked to what Thirumavalan refers to as ‘Hindutva’—a term he uses 
idiosyncratically to refer, not merely to the modern political movement that bears this name, but to 
brahminical Hinduism tout court, all forms of casteism, and to the violent suppression of religious 
minorities throughout Indian history, especially Buddhists, Muslims and Christians. Thus VCK 
members are also expected to give up names that identify them as members of any specific 
caste, even though in most cases these names are uniquely Tamil.27 
[25] Another prominent example of Thirumavalavan’s alleged ethno-linguistic 
nationalism is his vocal support of the LTTE. One should note that support for the LTTE’s cause 
(if not their methods) is virtually universal in Tamil Nadu, although the leaders of the mainstream 
Dravidian parties tend to avoid the issue because to openly sympathize with the Tamil Tigers 
would risk alienating the Dravidian parties’ allies in central government, especially Congress. 
Thus by openly championing the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils, Thirumavalavan simultaneously 
calls attention to what is popularly regarded as the hypocrisy of Dravidian leaders.28 But while the 
Tigers are consistently described by Thirumavalavan as brave warriors fighting on behalf of an 
oppressed minority, does this mean he embraces Tamil ethno-linguistic nationalism as such? 
(Certainly even the LTTE’s sworn enemies will not deny their bravery, and there is no doubt that 
Tamils are systematically discriminated against in Sri Lanka.) Reading Thirumavalavan’s stance 
on Sri Lanka closely, we find that as much as he wishes for Tamils to be freed from the yoke of 
Sinhala dominance, he recognizes that caste divisions exist among Sri Lankan Tamils and openly 
proclaims that ‘if you merely capture power from the Sinhalese it is not liberation,’ and ‘it will be 
useless if Hindutva [read: caste] remains’ (UH: 151).29 
                                                     
27 It may appear paradoxical, therefore, that VCK members have also rejected Christian and Muslim names as 
well. Thirumavalavan’s explanation for this policy is that in India these names have taken on caste connotations they 
do not possess elsewhere in the world—and indeed that, insofar as Indian Christians embrace caste, they too are 
part of what he calls ‘Hindutva’ (UH:133ff). Thirumavalavan has nevertheless consistently and prominently 
condemned anti-conversion legislation, and championed the inherent right of all Indians to convert to whatever 
religions they choose, especially so-called foreign religions like Christianity and Islam (Thirumavalavan 2002, TAL: 
143–146, 153–156, 161, UH: 90–91, 103, 105ff, 120ff, 136ff, 154, 170, 179ff, 214, 234–8). 
28 This is not to imply Thirumavalavan’s championing of the LTTE is motivated solely by political one-upmanship; 
his personal sympathies for the Tigers predate his involvement in Dalit politics by many years. 
29 Ravikumar also writes compellingly on the deep and unacceptable caste divisions among Sri Lankan Tamils in 
‘Caste of the Tigers’ (VT: 59–75). 
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[26] Thirumavalavan could not be more clear on this point: ‘We are not for a mere 
linguistic nationalism, it has to be... a caste-annihilating nationalism’ (UH: 153, emphasis added). 
The ‘nationalism’ Thirumavalavan espouses is defined not (like most modern nationalisms) by 
ties of blood, but oppositionally—it is a political nationalism premised upon common interests in 
opposing caste. Indeed, one might even argue that a nationalism based on opposition to caste 
has to be opposed to the valorization of common birth—for caste is, if nothing else, a political-
economic alliance premised on the ideology of common blood. And Thirumavalavan recognizes 
as much when he proclaims that opposing caste might very well mean opposing one’s own family 
members: ‘Tamilian unity lies in the opposition of Hindutva. In this opposition, one’s own uncle, 
one’s own brother-in-law might need to be opposed. One’s siblings might need to be opposed’ 
(UH: 153). Thus to return to the question of what Tamil means in Thirumavalavan’s discourse, we 
find him elsewhere re-defining ‘Tamil’ as a casteless person; the only true Tamils, in other words, 
are the outcaste Dalits and those who have embraced their cause (UH: 179). At this point one 
begins to sense that, far from subordinating Ambedkarite politics to Tamil, what Thirumavalavan 
is really up to is refashioning Tamil nationalism as a form of Ambedkarism. 
[27] At any rate, the contrast between Thirumavalavan’s ‘Tamil nationalism’ and what 
has normally gone under this name is striking. Elsewhere, for instance, he condemns historical 
kingdoms standard Tamil nationalism hails as paragons of Tamil virtue—the Cholas, Cheras, and 
Pandyas—and champions the so-called Kalappira period, during which Tamil Nadu was ruled by 
non-Tamil kings, on the grounds that under their rule anti-caste Buddhism and Jainism flourished 
(UH: 131, 145). By championing in the name of ‘Tamil nationalism’ positions that standard Tamil 
nationalists regard as perverse, Thirumavalavan invents a completely new Tamil nationalism—
one that does not define itself in opposition to foreign tongues. Just ‘because Thirumavalavan 
speaks of Tamil,’ he explains, ‘does not mean that he is against Kannadigas, or that he is against 
the Kannada language. I [say] to them, ‘You arrange a function to take [pure] Kannada names 
[i.e. which do not connote caste], and I shall take part in it’’ (UH: 148). 
[28] Another key feature of ‘Tamil’ in Thirumavalavan’s discourse that mainstream 
commentators have consistently ignored is its class connotations. For in Tamil Nadu today even 
the leaders of the allegedly pro-Tamil Dravidian movement, while preaching the greatness of 
Tamil and the importance of Tamil-medium education, send their own children to be educated in 
English medium schools just like other elites. Purely Tamil-medium education, by contrast, has 
become the exclusive domain of Dalits and other very poor people. As we have seen, the VCK 
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has nothing against learning foreign languages; to ‘study all languages’ is not just a slogan, but 
one of the greatest aspirations of the VCK’s poor cadres. To ‘protect Tamil,’ conversely, does not 
simply mean preserving the integrity of the Tamil language, nor even does it just mean protecting 
the casteless ideal that VCK discourse associates with the sign ‘Tamil.’ In addition to these 
meanings, to ‘protect Tamil’ is simultaneously to assert the dignity of those who have nothing 
else. 
Only the children of the cheris [i.e. Dalit ghettoes] are enrolled into the state-run 
corporation schools and learn Tamil. Even today, if someone speaks in Tamil, the co-
students mock, ‘Why do you speak like someone who has studied in a corporation 
school?’.... only the poor people living in the villages, particularly the Tamil Dalit 
people, and the people of the urban slums are the ones who are protecting Tamil.... 
The trend of mistreating and humiliating those who study in the state-run corporation 
schools and Tamil-medium schools is prevalent. (UH: 123, 129). 
[29] The VCK’s protest against script writing in which the lead characters of Tamil 
films pepper their speech with English phrases must be understood in this light. The point is not 
to oppose English as such, but to expose the celebration of an elite caste/class subjectivity in 
Tamil film that marginalizes Dalits and others who have been denied access to English 
education.30 
[30] I have dwelt on Thirumavalavan’s use of ‘Tamil’ because his pro-Tamil rhetoric 
has been a primary source of accusation against him. In so doing, I risk perpetuating the 
impression that most of his speeches and writings revolve around Tamil. This is not the case. 
While interpreting and commenting on the meanings and value of ‘Tamil’ are among his principal 
themes, readers whose only knowledge of Thirumavalavan comes from secondary sources will 
be surprised at the catholicity of his interests. In addition to caste, his speeches dwell at length on 
such issues as privatization (TAL: 85, 139–142, 169–173), poverty and class (TAL: 127ff, 175–
78), America’s ‘Global “supercop”-ism,’ racist attacks on Sikhs in the United States and the US 
embargo on Cuba (TAL: 19ff), and Indian law—especially the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the 
Goondas Act (repressive measures widely criticized by civil rights organizations, and which 
Thirumavalavan characterizes as a continuation of police practices under the British) (TAL: 39–
42, 51, 123–125; UH: 4, 18–19, 29, 80–81, 91). That Thirumavalavan should see these topics as 
not only within his natural purview, but matters of vital concern, comes as a surprise only to the 
extent that we have been taught to regard the Dalit movement as a sectional interest group 
                                                     
30 On the basis of my own ethnographic fieldwork in a Dalit slum in northern Chennai, I can testify to a 
widespread and deeply held ambition to learn English among those who live there—an ambition that in no way 
detracts from their profound identification with, and love of, the Tamil language. 
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(Gajendran 1998, Guru 1998). Viewed through their own eyes, however, the concerns of Dalits 
are not merely universal in aspiration but indeed already universal, whatever others may have to 
say about them. The truly sectional interests, rather, are the national and sub-national forces in 
India that seek to confine and exclude them.31 
[31] In reviewing the translated speeches and writings of Thirumavalavan I have been 
at pains to provide an accurate and sympathetic interpretation of his thought and often 
challenging message. This is the first duty of a reader to any text (Asad 1993). I have not 
attempted to assess the accuracy of his historical claims or of the sociological account his words 
imply, because Thirumavalavan does not write as a professional historian or sociologist. He is a 
politician, an organizer, a thinker, and an instigator. In concluding I would like to note a possible 
tension among these roles, a tension that turns on the gap between statements and other forms 
of action. For knowing what Thirumavalavan says, and what kind of vision he espouses, cannot 
tell us what he and his party will be able to do. Leaders of the Dravidian movement too once 
espoused radical ideas, and sometimes still do. Whether the VCK will attempt to make good on 
their radical message by fighting for real structural change—land reform, for example—or 
whether they will remain content with symbolic measures and adapt to the patronage-based 
politics of Dravidianism remains an open question. 
[32] I conclude with a brief note on Meena Kandasamy’s translations. An additional 
factor in the VCK’s growing success among Dalit voters has been the party’s ability to appropriate 
from the Dravidian parties not only the prestige of Tamil, but also—through the voice of 
Thirumavalavan himself—the genre of Tamil political oratory, at which the Dravidianists once 
reigned supreme (Bate 2009).32 For in addition to everything else, Thirumavalavan is widely 
acclaimed as the greatest orator of his generation. Readers hoping for a sense of what it feels 
like to listen to one of Thirumavalavan’s speeches, however, will come away disappointed. In part 
this is because much of the power of his oratory derives from delivery—a well-timed pause, an 
ironic twist conveyed by tone of voice—as well as from his ability to connect intimately with his 
audience by drawing upon his own minute understanding of a life-world that he and they share. 
These are aspects that no translator could hope to convey. Yet there are other aspects of his 
                                                     
31 Thus if one examines the pages of Putiya Kōṭāṅki or Talit Muṟacu (two prominent Tamil Dalit monthlies) one 
finds a similar range of concerns. The latter, for example, reports regularly on the condition of Palestinians, black 
South Africans, and is undertaking a serialized translation of Malcolm X.  
32 Although Dravidian leaders continue to give speeches in the elevated ‘mēṭait tamiḻ’ style, today’s speeches are 
a formulaic shadow of their former selves, according to Kandasamy (UH: xxii–xxiii). 
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speeches that do not depend on the form of their delivery or the specificity of context, and these 
might have been conveyed in English. But the translator, despite being a talented poet, has 
chosen to translate Thirumavalavan’s words in a strictly literal mode on the basis of the theory 
that this is more faithful to the original.33 The result is a technically precise, yet sometimes 
awkward, document that will be of great use to the scholar (particularly one with some access to 
Tamil) or to the committed student of Dalit politics, but may perhaps prove somewhat challenging 
for the casual inquirer. Adding to the volumes’ value as both scholarly and political documents are 
an immense number of highly detailed footnotes, which make a significant contribution in and of 
themselves.34 Apart from the sheer historical detail they provide, Kandasamy’s notes contain 
numerous original insights. To give but one outstanding example, note three on page seven 
points out that the physical separation of the Tamil Dalit hamlet (cēṟi) from the caste village (ūr) is 
not merely a symbolic expression of caste hierarchy—as generations of anthropologists have 
described it—but is also of (non-symbolic) strategic value in rendering Dalits perpetually 
vulnerable to traditional forms of collective punishment by caste people: being positioned several 
hundred meters downwind, the huts of the cēṟi can be safely torched without endangering caste 
villagers’ own dwellings.35, 36 
[33] Venomous Touch is a collection of essays by Ravikumar, one of today’s leading 
Tamil public intellectuals (and a Dalit).37 These essays, most of which were published between 
1992 and 2005, are even more wide-ranging than Thirumavalavan’s. His chapters include literary 
                                                     
33 Kandasamy discusses her choice in a translator’s note (TAL: xxvii–xxviii). 
34 In TAL these notes amount to a full page for every three pages of regular text, and in UH, one page for every 
two. 
35 Kandasamy claims specifically that in most parts of Tamil Nadu the cē฀i is positioned to the northeast of the 
village—and hence leeward of prevailing south-westerly winds (TAL 7 n.3). If she is correct about cē฀is’ positioning 
relative to prevailing wind patterns, this only enhances the significance of her observation. But what is clear is that 
arson (and the threat of arson) upon the cē฀i is among the traditional techniques of caste domination, and that 
technique would not be available if cē฀is were not located a safe distance from the main village (as they in fact are). 
That Dalits were traditionally prohibited from constructing homes with tiled (read: flame resistant) roofs has similarly 
been interpreted by anthropologists in a purely symbolic register as being merely about the denial of prestige (though 
it is certainly that too). The point here is not that the positioning of cē฀is (or the sorts of roofing materials used) is 
without symbolic significance, but about the weakness of anthropological theories that seek a symbolic rationalization 
for cultural practices without considering how they might be rational from other, non-symbolic standpoints as well 
(Asad 1979). Additional discussion of the strategic dimensions of cē฀i placement can be found in Viswanath (2006). 
36 For a discussion of the prevailing anthropological opinion, according to which caste is first and foremost a 
symbolic (ritual) order, and only secondarily a political–economic one, see Roberts (2008). 
37 It is also worth mentioning that Ravikumar is, in addition to being an intellectual and an activist, also a Member 
of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly and a prominent figure within the VCK, second only to Thirumavalavan 
himself. Not only that, he is the co-founder of Navayana, the young publishing house to which we owe Viswanathan’s 
Dalits in Dravidian Land and many other fine books focusing on Dalit issues, including Anand Teltumbde’s Khairlanji: 
A Strange and Bitter Crop (also reviewed in SAMAJ).  
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analyses of modern Tamil fiction,38 film criticism,39 an investigative report on electoral violence,40 
a meditation on the death penalty,41 an analysis of the relations among caste, land control and 
the state,42 an historical comparison of Dalit and elite native publishing in the late 19th and early 
20th century and the present day,43 an illuminating account of the position of Dalits in Sri Lanka 
and within the LTTE,44 a phenomenological investigation of the relations between work and 
leisure,45 an essay on the perverse parallels between sport and politics in domestic Indian politics 
and in the rivalry between India and Pakistan,46 another on the production of official knowledge of 
Dalits by both the state and by social science,47 and several on the meanings of democracy in 
theory and in practice.48 Ravikumar’s theoretical influences are as diverse as the topics that 
engage him, and include Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, the high-caste Tamil writer Pudumai 
Pithan,49 B. R. Ambedkar, Jacques Derrida, and the playwright Augusto Boal. I can only touch on 
a few of these here. 
[34] In an essay entitled ‘Boundaries of Dalit Narrative,’ Ravikumar speaks to a 
central theme of this review: translation, in the extended sense of the relation between particular 
languages and universal claims. ‘We are told,’ Ravikumar writes, ‘that the pygmy [i.e. small, 
parochial] dalit discourse must first become a Tamil national discourse, then an Indian national 
one, before it can aspire to universality’ (VT: 140). The topical and theoretical range of 
Ravikumar’s writing itself may be taken as rejecting a well-established division of intellectual labor 
that would confine Dalits to what is closest to them—a division which, in the world of commercial 
publishing, has resulted in a proliferation of Dalit autobiographies for non-Dalit consumption, while 
ceding questions of national and global interest to the professional theoreticians of India’s 
(Anglophone) elite. But Ravikumar pursues diverse topics not simply in order to resist the idea 
                                                     
38 Chapters 23 and 24. 
39 Chapter 22. 
40 Chapter 28. 
41 Chapter 16. 
42 Chapter 2. 
43 Chapter 3. 
44 Chapter 5. 
45 Chapter 13. 
46 Chapter 10. 
47 Chapter 21. 
48 Chapters 18, 24, 28 and 32. 
49 Among writers sympathetic to the Dalit cause it has become standard practice to place the term ‘high caste’ in 
quotation marks—the point being to signal one’s rejection of the claim that some people are really ‘higher’ than 
others. I do not follow this practice; caste is in its very essence a hierarchical system, and to speak of castes (as 
opposed to, say, ethnic groups) is to refer to entities that are by definition either higher or lower than others. 
Accurately specifying that position does not imply an endorsement of the ideological system on which it rests. 
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that Dalit discourse must necessarily be narrow; fundamentally, his intellectual restlessness is 
driven by a sense of existential struggle and the belief that knowledge may indeed prove a 
weapon in the hands of the oppressed. Thus underlining the essentially strategic dimension of 
Martin Luther King’s famous maxim ‘injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere,’ 
Ravikumar regards it as virtually a matter of survival that those ‘who have been regarded as 
viruses and isolated from the social body,’ would refuse to be confined by Tamil or Indian national 
concerns, but would instead find themselves driven ‘to collect information about oppressed 
communities throughout the world’ (VT: 140).50 The flip side of King’s maxim, therefore, is 
Ambedkar’s statement ‘I have no homeland’—which in the context of Ravikumar’s writings comes 
to refer not merely to the fact that, as a Dalit, he is treated as a foreigner in his own land, but that 
in his struggle for justice he cannot afford to be confined by national boundaries (VT: 121).51 
[35] Ravikumar’s essays are not those of professional academic, as he himself warns 
readers, nor does he regard himself as ‘serious literary critic’ (VT: 145). They read instead like the 
notebooks—desperate, hopeful, and frequently brilliant—of a prisoner who, after already 
devouring every book in the prison library, has now turned his attention to empirical studies of the 
prison itself. And his eye for unnoticed details in events that will already be familiar to readers of 
the other volumes under review can produce startling effects. In describing the pre-mediated 
murder of six Dalits in Melavalavu, for instance, Ravikumar pauses to contemplate the exact 
manner and sequence in which they were killed: after hacking off the head of K. Murugesan the 
attackers held it above the mouth of the mortally wounded but still living K. Cellatthurai, forcing 
the latter to drink his friend’s blood (VT: 179).52 These details were omitted from mainstream 
media accounts of the event, in which it appeared as just another sad and virtually inexplicable 
case of violence against Dalits. Murugesan’s only crime, so far as the standard reportage goes, 
was having defied the orders of the dominant Kallar community and run for the office of 
panchayat president. The effect of such reporting is to decontextualize rural caste politics to make 
it appear as if violence begins only with the elections themselves. Ravikumar’s ironic commentary 
on this matter is worth quoting in extenso. 
Dalits in Melavalavu are not allowed to wear smart, ironed clothes. On festive 
occasions, they are required to serve the village as a whole, as well as individual 
                                                     
50 Martin Luther King’s maxim provides the epigraph for Ravikumar’s ‘Mystery of Justice’ (VT: 178–183), an 
essay on the Melavalavu murders that I describe in the next paragraph. 
51Ambedkar’s ‘I have no homeland’ is quoted from Keer (1995: 166). 
52 The Melavalavu murders are also covered in DDL, chapters 11, 29 and 31, TAL, ch. 4, and in an extended 
translator’s footnote to the first chapter of UH, pp. 14–17. 
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Kallars, without any remuneration. They cannot use common village property or 
participate in public functions; they cannot even give money for holding village 
festivals. That was how things were before the murders shattered the ‘peace’ of the 
village. It was a place where life ran smoothly ‘like the togetherness of mother and 
children without any discrimination’ under the regime of the double-tumbler system, 
separate wells and segregated cremation grounds. All this ‘harmony’ is gone after the 
panchayat elections! (VT: 179) 
[36] Ravikumar’s approach is more often Benjaminian than anthropological—rather 
than persuading the reader by the sheer weight of accumulated of evidence, he seeks to 
illuminates the totality of a situation in a single well-chosen detail. But he shares entirely the 
anthropologist’s belief that apparently peripheral persons and events may disclose insights of 
more global significance. Thus having outlined the above facts about the murders and the social 
world within which they took place, he notes that a series of delays by the police and justice 
system permitted many of the accused to roam free for over a year prior to the trial, intimidating 
witnesses. When key police personnel are from the same community as the murderers, 
Ravikumar asks, and virtually the whole of the apparatus of justice is in the hands of caste 
people, what message does this send to the victims’ families? 
[37] In this particular case in Melavalavu a measure of justice was, against all odds, 
eventually served.53 In concluding his essay, Ravikumar lists the names of several other Dalits 
who had been killed in the vicinity of Melavalavu in preceding years, whose murders were never 
even brought to trial (VT: 183). ‘The absolute victim,’ Ravikumar elsewhere writes, quoting 
Jacques Derrida, ‘is a victim who cannot even protest. One cannot even identify the victim as a 
victim. He or she is totally excluded...[and] annihilated by history’ (VT: 238, Derrida 1995: 389). In 
naming these other victims Ravikumar attempts to write them into history, though he is quite 
aware that they will in all likelihood soon be forgotten once again, save by loved ones and those 
directly involved (VT: 181). 
[38] ‘Writing Tamil Dalits,’ the subtitle of this review, refers to Ravikumar’s endeavor—
as well as that of Viswanathan, Thirumavalavan, and translators Kandasamy and Azhagarasan—
to undo the structural violence that is the matrix of this forgetting. However, I could just as well 
have titled it ‘Translating Tamil Dalits,’ because every act of writing is an act of translation 
between contexts: from the act of murder to an act of writing, from a small Tamil magazine to an 
English language volume, from an Indian publishing house to an on-line review article. By way of 
this translational process, Ravikumar acts upon not only Melavalavu, but also upon Derrida and 
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Boal and the many other ‘foreign’ thinkers like Michel Foucault and B. R. Ambedkar he enlists, 
and in so doing transforms. Thus neither the Derrida nor the Foucault who appear on the pages 
of Ravikumar’s essays bear more than a passing resemblance to the ones I thought I knew—and 
for this very reason they have many new things to teach. 
[39] I began this review with the thought that if the Tamil Dalit movement is to be of 
any wider significance it must be in some sense translatable. It must be capable of instigating 
new arguments and new ideas—ones with not only intellectual, but political and legal 
consequences—in contexts quite different than those if its origin. And it is my contention that 
these writers have amply demonstrated this potential. 
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